GLJ Online

Pluralism on Appeal

In a thoughtful response to my article, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, Ori Aronson notes that judges “work in context, be it social, cultural, or . . . institutional,” and that “context matters” to their decisions.  Indeed, the primary aim of my article was to spur a conversation about the context in which the judges of the [...]

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Response Comment: Innovation, Aggregation, and Specialization

In his fascinating critique of Federal Circuit jurisdiction, Professor Gugliuzza employs multiple tools of institutional analysis in order to explore the “dark matter” that comprises most of that Court’s docket—its unsung caseload of the nonpatent variety—and to stimulate our institutional imagination in search of a better jurisdictional structure. Through a combined analysis of its theoretical [...]

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Response Essay: Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment

Professor Gugliuzza’s article, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, is a massive piece of scholarship inquiring into the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and proposing jurisdictional remedies in the hope of curing the Federal Circuit’s problem with patent law. Specifically, Professor Gugliuzza proposes to transfer much of the subject-matter jurisdiction [...]

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Reply to Professor Rothstein

In response to: Response Essay: Some Observations on Professor Schwartz’s “Foundation” Theory of Evidence by Paul Rothstein It is an honor and a privilege, both to have garnered Professor Rothstein’s careful and sympathetic reading of my article A Foundation Theory of Evidence (hereinafter “Foundation Theory”) and to have the opportunity to respond to his thought-provoking comments [...]

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Response Essay: Some Observations on Professor Schwartz’s “Foundation” Theory of Evidence

Professor David Schwartz’s A Foundation Theory of Evidence posits an intriguing new way to look at Evidence. It asserts that offered evidence must meet a tripartite requirement before it can be relevant. The tripartite requirement is that the evidence must be “case-specific, assertive, and probably true.” His shorthand for the tripartite requirement is that evidence [...]

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Response Essay: Temporal Variance, Hockey, and the Wartime Constitution

In “Let ‘Em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, Professor Mitchell Berman offers a thoughtful and engaging defense of the concept of temporal variance, the notion that “some rules of some sports should be enforced less strictly toward the end of close matches.”   In support of his position, Professor Berman draws on various [...]

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